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EXCLUSIONARY RULE
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974)
In United States v. Calandra,' the Supreme
Court again2 considered the application of the
exclusionary rule in grand jury proceedings.
In reversing two lower court decisions the Su-
preme Court held that a grand jury witness
was not entitled to invoke the exclusionary
rule in refusing to answer questions based on
an illegal search and seizure. In a subsidiary
question the Court also denied the witness the
right to interrupt the grand jury proceeding in
order to have a hearing on the legality of the
search.
A warrant was issued to search Calandra's
place of business, the Royal Machine & Tool
Co., pursuant to a grand jury investigation of
gambling operations. On execution of the war-
rant, the agents found no gambling parapher-
nalia but seized records of a loanshark operation
and various books and documents concerning
the suspected loansharking activity.
Calandra was subpoenaed to testify before a
grand jury but refused, invoking his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Having received a grant of transactional im-
munity,3 Calandra moved for suppression and
return of the illegally seized evidence. 4 Follow-
ing a hearing in which Calandra reiterated
that he would not answer questions based on
the illegally seized evidence, the district court
granted respondent's motion to suppress5 and
further ordered that respondent need not an-
swer any of the grand jury's questions based
on that evidence. 6 The Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the
1414 U.S. 338 (1974).
2 See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1
(1973); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 9
(1973).
3 This grant was made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
2514 (1971).
4 This motion was made pursuant to FED. R.
Cram. P. 41 (e).
5 The district court based its decision on the
grounds that the affidavit supporting the warrant
was insufficient and that the search exceeded the
scope of the warrant. In re Calandra, 332 F. Supp.
737 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
6 Id. at 746.
exclusionary rule may be invoked by a witness
before a grand jury proceeding to bar ques-
tioning based on illegally seized evidence.
7
Two early cases, Boyd v. United States,8
and Weeks v. United States,9 involved applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule."' Both decisions
held that no unreasonably or illegally seized
evidence could be used in federal criminal
cases. The holdings stressed the purpose of the
fourth amendment's principles" as they affect
7 United States v. Calandra, 465 F2d 1218
(1972). The court of appeals agreed with the
lower court's finding that the search and seizure of
Calandra's place of business were unlawful. 465
F.2d at 1226 n.5. The Supreme Court, while not in
accord, failed to contest this finding. It also failed
to consider the order to return Calandra's prop-
erty.8 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
9 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
10 In Boyd, the government claimed that the
plaintiffs had fraudulently imported goods into the
United States and thus forfeited the merchandise.
Plaintiffs entered a claim for the goods and
pleaded that the goods had not become forfeited as
alleged. Claimants brought an invoice for the
goods to court to show quantity and value but re-
fused to relinquish it to the district attorney argu-
ing that in a forfeiture suit no evidence can be
compelled from the claimants themselves and any
statute compelling such evidence is unconstitu-
tional.
In Weeks, plaintiff was convicted on the charge
of using the mails for the purpose of transporting
certain coupons or tickets representing chances or
shares in lottery or gift enterprises. Police officers
arrested him without a warrant at his place of
employment while other police searched his room
twice. While there, they took possession of various
papers and articles. No warrant was issued for ei-
ther search. Weeks later filed a "Petition to Re-
turn Private Papers, Books, and Other Property"
alleging that they were being held unlawfully. The
court directed the return of non-pertinent material
but refused to rule on the pertinent material.
Among the evidence entered at trial, over Week's
objections, were lottery tickets and statements
with reference to the lottery.
31 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no warrant shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or af-
firmation and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
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the very essence of constitutional liberty and
security. 2 Justice Bradley, writing the opinion
in Weeks, not only found that the exclusion of
illegally seized evidence enforces the basic
principles of humanity and civil liberty's but
also felt that if the court admitted such evi-
dence, it would sanction illegal activity by pub-
lic officials charged with upholding the
Constitution.' 4 To refuse to return the evidence
after timely objection violated the individual's
constitutional rights. 5
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States0
was the major case in this area, prior to the
Court's decision in Calandra. In that case fed-
eral agents, during a warrantless search of a
business, had seized several documents belong-
ing to the Silverthornes. The lumber company
owners, under indictment at the time, moved
the lower court to have the documents re-
turned on the ground that the search was un-
constitutional. The court granted the motion
and ordered the documents returned. A federal
grand jury issued a subpoena duces tecum to
the owners ordering them to produce and turn
over the documents seized. The owners refused
and were held in contempt. The Supreme
Court reversed the contempt citation, holding
32 See Lord Chandler's judgment in Entich v.
Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029.
13 Justice Bradley relied extensively on Brain v.
United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
34 The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to
put the courts of the United States and Fed-
eral officials in the exercise of their power
and authority, under limitations and restraints
as to the exercise of such power and author-
ity, and to forever secure the people, their
persons, houses, papers and effects against all
unreasonable searches and seizures under the
guise of the law. This protection reaches all
alike, whether accused of crime or not, and
the duty of giving to it force and effect is ob-
ligatory upon all entrusted under our federal
system with the enforcement of the laws. The
tendency of those who execute the criminal
laws of the country to obtain conviction by
means of unlawful seizures and enforced con-
fessions . . . should find no sanction in the
judgment of the courts which are charged at
all times with the support of the Constitution
and to which people of all conditions have a
right to appeal for the maintenance of such
fundamental rights.
232 U.S. at 391.
15 The Court refused to inquire into the reme-
dies a defendant may have against the officials, "as
the Fourth Amendment is not directed to individ-
ual misconduct of such officials." 232 U.S. at 398.
16 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
that the subpoena was the fruit of the illegal
search.'
7
In 1961, in a five-to-four decision, the Su-
preme Court, in Mapp v. Ohio'8 declared that
the exclusionary rule was constitutionally man-
dated and therefore had to be followed by all of
the states.19 The Court viewed the fourth
amendment as the embodiment in the Constitu-
tion of a principle prohibiting unwarranted
searches and seizures. The Court then con-
cluded that the exclusionary rule best accom-
plished this prohibition.
Eight years later in Davis v. Mississippi,
20
Justice Brennan, writing for a majority of the
Court, held that fingerprints taken from an il-
legally detained defendant were inadmissible as
evidence. 2' Here, however, the Court stated the
objective of the exclusionary rule as a sanction
to redress and deter overreaching governmen-
tal conduct prohibited by the fourth amend-
ment. Relying principally on Bynum v. United
States,22 the Court stressed that the overriding
consideration of the exclusionary rule is to
prohibit any gain to those who violate fourth
amendment safeguards. It is irrelevant that the
evidence obtained during such seizure and de-
tention is itself trustworthy, that equivalent ev-
idence can conveniently be obtained, or that it
may be relatively easy for the government to
17 Justice Holmes in his opinion stated:
[T]he essence of a provision [the fourth
amendment forbidding the acquisition of evi-
dence in a certain way] is that not merely ev-
idence so acquired shall not be used before the
Court, but that it shall not be used at all.
Id. at 392.
18 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'9 Historically, there has been a difference of
opinion among the state courts as to whether the
exclusionary rule is merely a judicially made rule
of evidence or whether the Constitution mandated
this rule. Before 1961, states had, by their choice,
accepted or rejected such a rule.
20 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
2l An eighty-six year old white woman who had
allegedly been raped described her assailant as a
Negro youth. Police found some fingerprints on
the window through which the assailant had ap-
parently entered. The defendant and others were
taken to police headquarters where they were
questioned and fingerprinted. Several days later,
the defendant was jailed and fingerprinted again.
His fingerprints matched those on the window of
the widow's home. The'defendant was convicted of
rape, the Court overruling his objection that the
fingerprints were inadmissible as the product of an
unlawful detention.




prove guilt without using the product of an il-
legal detention.
23
In United States v. Dionisio24 and its com-
panion case United States v. Mara,25 Justice
Stewart, writing for six members of the
Court,26 expressed the view that compelling a
grand jury witness to furnish voice exemplars
did not violate the fourth amendment and thus
did not requirea preliminary showing of rea-
sonableness.2 7 A subpoena to appear before a
grand jury is not a seizure in the fourth
amendment sense, however inconvenient and
burdensome it may be.2 8 Additionally, the
Court rejected respondent's argument that a
command to make a voice exemplar is in itself
an infringement of an individual's rights.
There is no reasonable expectation that the
sound of one's voice will not be known by
others.
2 9
In the instant case, Justice Powell, writing
23 In dissenting opinions both Justice Black and
Justice Stewart argued that this was an unneces-
sary expansion of the fourth amendment. Even if
the defendant were illegally detained by police, it
was not necessary to exclude the fingerprints,
which can easily be reproduced at trial. 394 U.S.
at 729 (Black, J., dissenting); 394 U.S. at 730
(Stewart. J., dissenting).
24 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
25 410 U.S. 9 (1973).
26 Seven members of the Court felt that compel-
ling a grand jury witness to furnish voice exem-
plars did not violate the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination since the exemplar was
to be used solely to measure the physical proper-
ties of the witness' voice, not for the content of
what was said.
27 A federal grand jury investigating gambling
had subpoenaed about twenty persons and directed
them to make voice recordings by reading a tran-
script into a recording device. Dionisio refused and
the court held him in contempt after the govern-
ment was granted a petition compelling compli-
ance. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed, holding that the fourth anendment
required a preliminary showing of reasonableness
before the witness could be compelled to furnish
the exemplar. United States v. Dionisio, 442 F.2d
276 (7th Cir. 1971). In an earlier case, Gelbard v.
United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1971), the Supreme
Court held that grand jury witnesses had stand-
ing under the wiretap statutes to challenge illegal
electronic surveillances.
2s The Court cited Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 682 (1972), which held that "citizens
generally are not constitutionally immune from
grand jury subpoenas." The overriding feeling was
that "the public has a right to every man's evi-
dence." Id. at 688.
29United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14
(1973).
for six Justices,"° rejected the court of ap-
peals' interpretation of the exclusionary rule as
applied to grand jury proceedings. The Court
found no justification in the fourth amendment
for restriciting the grand jury's ability to com-
pel a witness to answer questions based on the
fruits of an illegal search and seizure.2 1
Justice Powell stated that the prime purpose
of the exclusionary rule was to "deter future
unlawful police conduct," 32 not to compensate
the victim of the unlawful search. Acknowledg-
ing that there was little empirical evidence as
to the extent of the rule's efficacy, the Court
held that the "rule is a judicially created rem-
edy designed to safeguard fourth amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect,
rather than a personal constitutional right of
the party aggrieved. '3 Thus, Justice Powell
argued, the exclusionary rule has and should
continue to be used only in situations where
incrimination of the search victim is the gov-
ernment's primary goal.
34
Justice Powell noted that the court of appeals
based its justification of the use of the exclu-
sionary rule in the grand jury proceeding on
rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. s Rule 41 (e) provides in part that
"(a) person aggrieved by an unlawful search
and seizure may move the district court . . .
for the return of the property and to suppress
for the use as evidence anything so obtained.
3o Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart,
White, Blackmun and Rehnquist also joined in the
opinion.
31414 U.S. at 347.
22 Id. at 347. Justice Powell cited the Court in
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960):
The rule is calculated to prevent, not to re-
pair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel re-
spect for the constitutional guaranty in the
only effectively available way-by removing
the incentive to disregard it.
Accord, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968);
Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1968) ; Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
33 414 U.S. at 348. However, a study has been
performed contrasting search and seizure practices
in Toronto, Canada, with those in Chicago.
The study concluded that the deterrent ratio-
nale for the rule does not seem to be justified (by
the empirical study) and Canada's experience with
the tort remedy suggests that viable alternatives to
the rule do exist.
Spiotto, The Search and Seizure Problem-Two
Approaches: The Canadian Tort Remedy and the
U.S. Exclusionary Rule, 1 J. PorxcE Sc'. & AD. 36
(1973).
34 414 U.S. at 348.
35 465 F2d at 1222.
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... ." In overruling the appellate court, the Su-
preme Court relied on Alderman v. United
States,3" and Jones v. United States.37 The
Court in these cases held that rule 41(e) "is
no broader than the constitutional rule" and
therefore is not a statutory expansion of the
exclusionary rule.38
The Court also rejected respondent's claim
that each and every question based on the
fruits of an illegal search and seizure consti-
tuted a separate infringement on his fourth
amendment rights.39 Justice Powell reasoned
that the wrong committed by the government
officials was the original illegal search and seiz-
ure; questions based on the illegally obtained
material were only a "derivative use of the
product" of the unlawful activity.40 While
acknowledging that in a criminal trial the de-
fendant is entitled to exclusion of illegally
seized evidence and the derivative use of such
evidence, the Court refused -to apply that rule
in a grand jury proceeding.41
While recognizing that the grand jury's sub-
poena power is not unrestrained, the Court ac-
knowledged a "historically grounded obligation
of every person to appear and give his evi-
dence before the grand jury." 42 However, the
court cannot force the grand jury witness to
answer questions in violation of his fifth
amendment privilege.43 Only a grant of immu-
nity co-extensive with the privilege against
self-incrimination may override the fifth
amendment claim.44 A grand jury cannot com-
pel a person to produce books and papers that
would incriminate him,45 nor can it invade an
area of privacy protected by the fourth amend-
36 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
37 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
38 414 U.S. at 349 n.6.
39 Id. at 353. Justice Powell stated that the
grand jury questions must not merely invade re-
spondent's privacy but must also constitute inde-
pendent violations of his fourth amendment rights
because they are based on illegally seized evidence.
.40 Id. at 354.
41 Id.
42 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9
(1973).
-' Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479
1951); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159
1950); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547
(1892).
44Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441
(1972).
45 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633
(1886).
merit. The fourth amendment also bars issu-
ance of a subpoena duces tecum that is "far
too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as
reasonable." 46
Justice Powell argued that the basic function
of the grand jury is to protect citizens against
unfounded criminal prosecutions and to dis-
cover whether probable cause exists to believe
a crime has been committed.47 Relying exten-
sively on Branzburg v. Hayes,48 Justice Powell
stated that the grand jury proceeding is not an
adversary proceeding but investigatory in scope
and thus should not be burdened with the tech-
nical rules of evidence.
49
Along with broad investigatory power, the
Court further emphasized that the grand jury
must select freely from varied sources of infor-
mation. The character of evidence discovered
should not invalidate an indictment valid on its
face. 50
Justice Powell concluded that in determining
whether to apply the exclusionary rule to
grand jury proceedings one must "weigh the
potential injury to the historic role and func-
tions of the grand jury against the potential
benefits of the rule as applied in this context." 51
He again stressed the need for an unhampered
investigation, reasoning that separate eviden-
tiary hearings would only delay and disrupt the
proceedings.
52
46 See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906).
47 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686
(1972).4
9 Id.
49 Justice Powell's argument relied on Blair v.
United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919), where the
Court stated:
It [the grand jury] is a grand inquest, a body
with powers of investigation and inquisition,
the scope of whose inquiries is not to be lim-
ited narrowly by result of investigation, or by
doubts whether any particular individual will
be found properly subject to an accusation of
crime.
Id. at 282.
Similar language is found in Branzburg v.
Hayes, 409 U.S. 665, 700 (1972); Costello v.
United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1955).
50414 U.S. at 338. The argument followed
closely that of the majority in Costello v. United
States, 350 U.S. 359 (1955) and Holt v. United
States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910). The Court, in Lawn
v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958), ruled that
an indictment based on information obtained in vi-
olation of a defendant's fifth amendment privilege
is valid.
5 414 U.S. at 349.
5? See Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 70
(1971) (White, J., concurring).
1974]
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Against this potential damage to the grand
jury process the Court weighed the benefits of
excluding the illegally seized evidence. Recog-
nizing that the rule is an effective measure at
trial, the Court pointed out that not every
method of deterring unlawful police conduct has
been adopted. 53 In line with their position that
the exclusionary rule serves merely to deter
unlawful official conduct, the Court found that
the slight additional deterrent effect is far out-
weighed by the potential damage to the grand
jury process. The Court believed that the ap-
plication of the rule would only deter the
collection of evidence during a grand jury in-
vestigation where there is already enough in-
centive to observe the provisions of the fourth
amendment since illegally seized evidence, al-
though admissible at the grand jury stage, is
not admissible at trial proceedings.
54
In his dissent, 55 Justice Brennan rejected
the majority's conclusion that the main objec-
tive of the exclusionary rule is the deterrence
of unlawful police conduct, and called it a
"startling misconception ... of the historical
objective and purpose of the rule." 56 He viewed
the exclusionary rule as merely a tool to fur-
ther implement the provisions of the fourth
amendment. Curtailment of the evil is, at most,
a "hoped for effect of the exclusionary rule,
not its ultimate objective." 57
Justice Brennan further stated that the exclu-
sionary rule works towards minimizing the loss
of public trust in government by separating the
judiciary from officials acting in lawless activ-
ity. In Weeks,58 the Court pointed out that
sanctioning such illegal official behavior is ov-
ertly opposed to the objectives of the fourth
amendment. Justice Brennan acknowledged
that the Court in Mapp v. Ohio,59 considered
53 In Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165,
174 (1969), the Court refused to extend the exclu-
sionary rule to anyone except the victim of the
search.
54 414 U.S. at 351. The Court reasoned further
that a prosecutor would be unlikely to obtain an
indictment if he felt he would be unable to get a
conviction.
55 He was joined by Justices Douglas and Mar-
shall.
56 414 U.S. at 356 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57 Id.
58232 U.S. 383, 391 (1914). Accord, Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis,
Holmes, JJ.; dissenting).
59 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961).
the deterrent effect, but argued that that con-
sideration did not justify the majority citing it
as the sole determinant.60
Justice Brennan viewed Silverthorne as con-
trolling, where, as here, a grand jury witness
sought to avoid supplying the grand jury with
illegally seized evidence. 61 Justice Brennan dis-
agreed with the majority's contention that Sil-
verthorne did not control because the Silver-
thornes had already been indicted and had in-
voked the rule as criminal defendants. He
argued that the Court overlooked the fact that
the grand jury's interest in again obtaining
documents from the Silverthornes may have
been to secure information leading to further
criminal charges.
6 '
Justice Brennan also rejected the majority's
reasoning that the witness' fourth amendment
rights are protected "by the inadmissibility of
the illegally seized evidence in a subsequent
criminal prosecution of the search victims.
'6 3
He viewed the search as a violation of Calan-
dra's fourth amendment rights and felt that the
majority was withholdng proper relief. Justice
Brennan feared that his colleagues were about to
abandon the exclusionary rule in all search and
seizure cases, a rule, which "gave light to
Madison's prediction that 'independent tribun-
als of justice ... will be naturally led to resist
every encroachment upon rights expressly stip-
ulated for in the Constitution by the declara-
tion of rights.'" 64
60 414 U.S. at 359 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 360 (Brennan, 3., dissenting).
2 Id. at 362 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan cited the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 2515
(1971) by Congress as an outgrowth of the Silver-
thorne case. It provides that:
Whenever any wire or oral communication
has been intercepted, no part of the contents
of such communication and no evidence de-
rived there from may be received in evidence
in any . . . proceeding in or before any . . .
grand jury ... if the disclosure of that infor-
mation would be in violation of this chapter.
Justice Brennan also cited the Court in Silver-
thorne in its comment on the new law:
Moreover, § 2515 serves not only to protect
the privacy of communications, but also to in-
sure that the courts do not become partners to
illegal conduct: the evidentiary prohibition
was enacted also to protect the integrity of
court and administrative proceedings.
408 U.S. at 51.
63 414 U.S. at 351 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Having been granted transactional immunity any-
way, Calandra could not be criminally prosecuted.
64 Id. at 366 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See 1
ANNALS oF CONG. 439 (1778).
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Both the majority and dissenting opinions
considered at length the historical function of
the grand jury. The majority stressed its in-
vestigatory purpose which was not to be un-
necessarily hampered. The dissent stressed the
need to protect citizens from harassment by
the government. The majority took the view
that the grand jury is necessary to secure the
fair and prompt administration of criminal jus-
tice. The right of privacy is secondary to the
search for the truth in the grand jury proceed-
ings. In going beyond Dionisio, the majority
found no reasonable expectation of privacy in
private papers when they are pertinent to a
grand jury investigation. It is every person's
duty to come forward and give his evidence;
considerations of privacy are secondary. It was
the majority's view that the exclusionary rule
is necessary only to deter future unlawful official
conduct. Once the wrong has been committed,
there is no need to suppress evidence which
has been uncovered for use in the grand jury
investigation.
Although this case severely limits the appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule in grand jury
proceedings, use of the rule is still preserved
at trial. The Court seemed to feel that because
the grand jury is merely an investigatory and
intermediary step in the administration of jus-
tice, to allow interminable objections and hear-
ings into the admission of evidence would un-
necessarily delay the criminal justice process.
1974]
